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September 8, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Some Additional Observations Regarding the Call-Up
of Reserves; Military and Disarmament PlanningI. Call-Up of Reserves

Henry Owen tells me that consideration is again being given to the calling up of reserves and of National Guard divisions. I continue to believe that this step would be unwise for the reasons outlined in my memorandum of July 15. Let me summarize my reasons:

(a) Calling up reserves and National Guard divisions introduces additional rigidities into our posture. It may make us prisoners of a mobilization schedule; it may set up a clamor for either a rapid settlement or for a final show-down. In short, it will reduce our capability to face a prolonged crisis;

(b) It will give the Soviets a psychological advantage by enabling them to "claim provocations";

(c) It seems illogical to me to build up our strength by relying on these forces whose readiness is already fairly high. The wiser course would seem to me to be to step up draft calls and increase our readiness by all means short of calling reserves. The reserves and National Guard division -- which I understand require only three to four months to be brought to combat effectiveness -- could then be called in as a show-down appears imminent;

(d) We require some measures as counter to Soviet pressures. Calling up reserves and National Guard divisions should be kept back as a response to such moves as harassment or interruption of air access; and

(e) I am of course in favor of pushing our build-up by all other means.

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E.O. 12358, Sec. 3.4

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By SKF

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II. Military Planning

The prime requirement seems to me to be completing our military contingency planning for Berlin. By this I mean something more than assurances by the JCS that they have matters well in hand. The plans must be such that the President understands their implications, and what is even more important, can have confidence in them.

As you know, I support the conventional build-up. My objection is that it does not go far enough, and particularly that it must find its ultimate expression not so much in force levels as in military concept.

However, I remain convinced that the President should not be asked to make a decision about going to nuclear war in the abstract. He should be told in detail just what his options are in the nuclear field. These options cannot possibly be improvised and they must be defined now.

This is why it is essential that the military understand now what the President is prepared to countenance and what he will not agree to. They should be ordered to produce options for a flexible nuclear response even if they do not consider it the optimum strategy.

III. Disarmament Planning

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Henry A. Kissinger

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